INTRODUCTION
The Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) was developed during 1984. Intrusion detection system is mainly divided into two categories: host-based IDS and network-based IDS. After the 1990s, the intrusion detection system began to develop in two directions distributed and intelligent. DoS or DDoS is a typical network intrusion, which maliciously consumes the target server's limited resources make it crashed [16] .
Traditional intrusion detection system driven by market demand and satisfy the needs of the development of technology itself, there have been some new forms. Generally speaking, the current task of intrusion detection research not only to perfect the necessary technology, but also further strengthen the study of statistical analysis and other related technologies [13] .
The development of intrusion detection system has to solve the current problems it is facing, so its development trend is embodied in these aspects:
1. The standardization of intrusion detection system: The current intrusion detection systems lack of unified standard, a variety of IDS has its own set of independent system, cannot achieve information exchange and data exchange. Although these standards and the draft is not yet mature, but the standardization of intrusion detection system is the trend absolutely.
2. Distributed Intrusion Detection: A distributed IDS has the advantages that traditional single IDS lacking of. Distributed intrusion detection system is capable of detecting distributed network attack, can extract global information in the case of intrusion attack effectively, and can improve the ability of data collection system of make the best use of resources, improve the efficiency of intrusion analysis, speed up the automatic response etc.
3. Intelligent intrusion detection: IDS will further strengthen the self-learning and adaptive ability, improve the detection efficiency. 4 . Cooperation with other network systems and technologies: In combination with other network products can expand the scope of IDS network security, improve the detection of the IDS and the ability of resist a variety of network intrusion, provide more network security services.
5. The application layer intrusion detection: The current intrusion detection system can only detect some simple protocol, but is usually helpless for the application layer network intrusion, and some large application based on the customer, with server structure, is an urgent need to intrusion detection system to provide protection.
II. RELATED WORK
Intrusion detections can be divided into AnomalyDetection and Misuse-Detection [1] according to principle it adopt. Intrusion detections can be divided into host-based, network-based and hybrid according to object [8] .
Host-based: The analysis of the detection system is computer various log data and records, such as operating system event log, the system call records, etc.
Network-based: The analysis data of the detection system is all kinds of packets on the network.
Hybrid: Combines both advantages of host-based detection system network-based detection system, analysis the log and network packets.
A. Intrusion Detection Methods and Procedures
Intrusion detection method is also named intrusion detection technology; it is on the basis of classification of intrusion detection model. Intrusion detection methods mainly divided into two categories.
Anomaly detection method: based on Bayesian inference method, Based on the statistics, Based on model prediction, Based on machine learning, Data mining techniques, detection method based on application of model and detection method based on the text classification.
Misuse detection method: Mode-matching method, Expert system approach and Based on state transition analysis method.
Intrusion detection process can be divided into three parts, information collection, information analyst and results.
Information collection: Mainly to collect all kinds of behavior and characteristics of information. Different detection system varies in information collected, Information analyst: The collected information will be sent to the sensor detection engine, and through the pattern matching, integrity analysis and statistical analysis to analyze these information. If detected intrusion information will generate a warning.
B. Intrusion Detection in Recent Research
Intrusion detection research has decades of history, but with the development of the Internet and new intrusion methods emerge in endlessly, intrusion detection systems continue to expose new problems. The existing problems mainly for these aspects [9] :  For high frequency and large scale network attacks, intrusion detection systems can't make a timely response, it Resulting in serious false positives and false negatives.

The problem of cooperation between intrusion detection system and other network products.  Based on the network intrusion detection system can't detect the encrypted data flow.  Intrusion detection system architecture problems in itself. The main direction for the research of network intrusion is improve intrusion detection algorithm and the intrusion detection system. The study of Classification of DDoS attacks, in order to develop more efficient algorithm and better detection technology through analyzing all kinds of DDoS defense mechanisms' advantages and disadvantages. Specializes in the manipulation of the zombies invasion detection method, it mainly through the analysis of related TCP/IP packets contents to detect the attack [2, 10] . In addition, for an intrusion detection system, the rate of false positive and false negative is one of the important performance indicators. A common understanding is that a detection system cannot have a very low rate of false positives meanwhile the false negative rate is also low, the low rate of false positives often means high false negative rate while low false negative rate often means a high rate of false positives. So someone specializing in the research of false positives and false negatives, trying to have somehow false positives and false negative rates are maintained at a relatively low level [3] .There are more extensive study of DoS/DDoS attacks because DoS/DDoS attacks is simple in principle, with large existence range, and is great harmful to network security. There are some study of DoS/DDoS, such as detection of DDoS flooding attack based on F-divergence [4] ,Thwarting DDoS attacks in grid using information divergence [5] , Novel DoS/DDoS attack detection and signature generation [6, 7] .
Different from the previous works, we proposed a adaptive connections-constrained model for developing and implementing intrusion detection systems. The adaptive model consists of four parts, each one of which is based on statistical properties of the input alert set. Special characteristics of alerts corresponding to true attacks are exploited.
III. CONNECTION STATISTICS AND CLASSIFICATION
In the field of Internet traffic classification, large connections will be sometimes referred to as elephant and small connections as mice. For several reasons, this dichotomy is largely used in the literature, e.g. see the discussion in [11] . Internet flow is mainly made of mice connections whose size is of a few packets [12] . Despite that these connections represent the majority of active connections; they only transfer a small proportion of the total number of packets. These connections cannot be the origin of a DDoS attack. Thus, they are useless within the scope of this work.
Each In/Out packet modifies one record in the connection table. Connection can only carry traffic from one protocol and one application. Legitimate connection models define statistics contents. Connection classification is performed each connection observation interval seconds. During classification, We compares connection statistics with corresponding legitimate connection models. Good connections receive guaranteed good service during the rate-limit phase, while bad and transient connections have to compete for the rate-limited bandwidth. The difference in handling bad and transient connections is present only in connection table record handling. Bad connection records never expire, while a bad connection record will be deleted only after the connection has stopped sending traffic and is classified as good. Transient connection records expire after a very short interval.
IV. RELATED ENTROPY OF PACKETS-CONTEXT
Entropy, a supervised splitting technique used to determine how informative a particular input attribute is about the output attribute for a subset, is calculated on the basis of the class label.
Let X be a discrete random variable with outcomes and probability mass function ( )
The average information gain when the outcome of X is defined by
The joint entropy H(X,Y) of a pair of discrete random variable (X,Y) with a joint distribution ( , ) p x y is defined as
.
Definition3:
According the chain rule, we have the equation According to Equation \ref{eq:HX} and \ref{eq:MI}, we can get the () HD as follow:
So, the joint entropy H(X,Y) can represent as
V. DDOS DETECTION MECHANISM Four steps are basically to be followed from observing a traffic stream to raising an alarm as shown in Fig. 1 .
The first step is to gather information from streaming traffic. At a particular link, the packets' capture module observes packets IP headers and collects statistics. The second step is to measure any variation observed in the distribution of inflow connections size over time. This is the horizontal distance measurement process where the profiles of packet features are compared, and their similarity is given a numerical value between 0 and 1. A threshold of measured KL-divergence that can differentiate network anomalies from normal behaviors is set. After this phase, a flow is said to be abnormal or normal. The third step is applied only on abnormal flows to distinguish DDoS attacks from flash crowds by vertically applying the KL-divergence between the inflow and outflow connections size distribution. Finally, the fourth step is to gather all the information and classify the attack alerts with the possibility of identifying the sources causing change. 
A. In/Out Flows Monitoring
The observation component monitors the traffic at the connection number in order to detect difficulties in communication that could be a sign of a DDoS attack. A In/Out flow is defined as the aggregate traffic between the police address set and a foreign host. Additionally, it monitors two-way traffic at the connection level, attempting to identify legitimate connections that should receive good service in case the associated flow becomes rate-limited. A connection is defined as the network traffic between two classes IP addresses, where one address belongs to the police address set, and the other is a foreign address. The packet attributes are extracted from the packet header and hashed to unique value. These unique hash values of selected features correspond to hash bins, with an initial counter value of 1. Each time, with the arrival of a next incoming packet, if the hashed value of its traffic feature points to an already existing hash bin, the traffic monitoring module just increments the counter value. Otherwise, a new hash bin with an initial counter value of 1 is created. The creation of hash bins and incrementing counter values occur in each observation window.
Our approach only requires access to the IP header of each packet whose sources or destinations IP address belong to all monitored IP addresses. This makes it practical and easy to implement online even at high speed links.
B. KL-divergence
How to effectively describe the change on connections size distribution in a manner that provides the necessary information for attack detection is the key question. Generally, a network provides the customers with many JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 9, NO. 8, AUGUST 2014 2047 services and every Internet service corresponds to a specific Internet application. The sizes of connections vary substantially in accordance with the type of the used Internet application, the connection size distribution depends primarily on the number of clients using each service. It is then reasonable to expect that the connections size distribution is generally short term stable. So, the majority of active connections numbers as shown in the Fig. 2 . By find a gauge that allows exploiting this property of connection count to detect abnormal variations in the inflow connections size, while highlighting the new IP addresses that should be the source of a possible attack. After conducting observations, we found out that KLdivergence [14] , which describes the non-symmetric measure of the difference between two probability distributions normal flows P and abnormal flows Q. Specifically, the Kullback-Leibler divergence of Q from P, denoted ( || ) KL D P Q , is a measure of the information lost when Q is used to approximate P for extracting the properties of connections size distribution in a manner that is appropriate for DDoS attack detection.
The symmetric KL distance as way to estimate the distances between probability measures independently of the parameters
C. DDos Detection Moduler
We mainly offer this work to correct defects in DDoS attack detection approaches based relative entropy of packet' context. Entropy was the most previously used DDoS detection gauge [6, 15, 18] . Entropy in its basic form is a measure of uncertainty rather than a measure of information. Specifically, the entropy of a random variable describes the degree of dispersal or concentration of a distribution. When the entropy of a random variable is large, uncertainty as to the value of that random variable is large, and vice versa. In other words, the entropy can detect and distinguish DDoS attacks from legitimate flow when the flow maintains a target level of coherence between the size of aggregate flow and the number of active connections.
We note two major flaws in the use of entropy. First, the calculated value of entropy depends only on the values taken by each variable distribution (i.e. proportion of each connection), but does not depend on the variable itself (i.e. couple of IP address that constitutes each connection). This prevents the entropy to follow the natural evolution of the flow which appears in the renewal of IP addresses.
Secondly, the values of the sizes of the legitimate connections can be very different in the sense that the size of few connections may be greater than the sum of the sizes of other connections. In this case, coherence between the aggregate flow size and the number of active connections is impossible to quantify using a single gauge as it is the case for entropy or KL-divergence. In section6we will show that the use of an KL-divergence gives best results. These characteristics of entropy-based approaches can be easily exploited by hackers to construct a stream that follows the distribution of normal flow. The task of the hackers is facilitated by the fact that the preset threshold of normal flow must take into account the sudden changes frequently reported in the Internet streams. Lastly, in this work we used only the distribution of the number of packets per connection as a feature. all existing entropy-based schemes used many other features such as the number of bytes, the number of ports, etc. Our goal is to show that our KL-divergencebased approach gives better results. An extension for other types of features or a combination of features is then possible.
D. Packet Processing
(1) Extraction of the timestamp. The original data packet according to the packet header information, extracts the time stamp stored in the database.
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(2) Extraction of data packets inside the property. According to an internal packet attributes, you can extract a greater impact on the data DDoS attacks. The main extract the source port number, the client's SEQ serial number, window size, and SYN, ACK, FIN, PSH, URG, RST six flags. These features, together with a time stamp in front of the packet to extract a record as recorded on the same time stamp data in which the same record. So in a record time frame which, it contains the following 10 fields: timestamp, source port number, the client's SEQ serial number, window size, and SYN, ACK, FIN, PSH, URG, RST six flags.
It is emphasized that although the source IP address provides important information, but not used in the acquisition process is mainly based on the following reasons: It requires a very high computing ability to store each address; It cannot provide information on the packet length ; IP source address may have been changed, and is set to a random address.
By the TCP/IP packets transmitted in some other fields such as TTL domain, it basically does not contain information about when DDoS attacks occur, it is not recorded.IP source address may have been changed, and is set with Address machine.
The TCP/IP packets transmitted in some other cases the domain If the TTL field, it basically does not contain information about DDoS attacks appear information, it is not recorded Taking into account only the useful information, we have considered the common IP connections which are active in both the training window and the observation window. To prove our hypothesis, we used two scatter plot figures.
E. Detection Algorithm
This first phase involves using the KL-Distance matrix to indicate the occurrence of abnormal disruption in statistics for the inflow connections size distribution. It enables us to quantify the distribution of the variation over the time of the useful connections size. By observing the time series of the KL-Distance matrix between two successive time windows, we can expose the similarity between two connection size distributions and detect suspicious attack points. 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To do this evaluation, the proposed method is implemented using C++, Snort and PC (Intel Core 2 Duo, 2.10GHz, 2 GB Ram).The DDoS KL-divergence are extracted from KDD Cup 99 dataset [18] and DARPA dataset [17] . Each record of KDD is a TCP/IP connection, which can be classified into four attacks types: Dos,Probing,U2R,R2L. (1). Dos: Denial of service (2) . Probing: Surveillance and other probing, e.g. port scanning (3). U2R: unauthorized access to local super user (root) privileges, e.g. buffer overflow attacks. (4). R2L: unauthorized access from a remote machine, e.g. password guessing. The training data was processed to about five million connections records from seven weeks of network traffic and two weeks of testing data yielded around two million connection records. The training data is made up of 22 different attacks out of the 39 present in the test data. The known attack types are those present in the training dataset while the novel attacks are the additional attacks in the test datasets not available in the training data sets.
It is an off-line intrusion detection benchmark is used for the experiment. We use the DARPA dataset as training data set, and separate DARPA dataset (LLS_DDOS_1.0) from 8 different parts (each part about 40000 packets). In Fig. 3 shows that the occurrence of DDoS attack leads to a significant increase in the IPV4 connections In/Out flows connections. Table-1 shows that at this stage of detection, our approach is better than entropy-based detection. Our detection method of the KL-divergence between in/out flow connections tiger alerts and Snort IDS detect results as follow: 
F. Bandwidth Utilization
Throughput is defined as the number of bits per second of legitimate traffic that are received at the destination. At time 0 the throughput starts increasing slowly due to slow start phase of TCP. Once it reaches near to bandwidth of bottleneck link, it remains stable there when there is no attack. When attack is launched at 20 sec, it declines immediately. As the attack rate is high during attack throughput reaches to zero.
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Bandwidth utilization is defined as percentage of bandwidth that is being used for experiment The percentage of band with utilization is near to 100% when there is no attack. When attack is launched the percentage reaches to zero due to impact of attack. The experiments that we conducted show that the Packets connections provides better results than other measures such as Snort and RFP [15] . The detection system processed 236753 packets, Ethernet packets have 237055, VLAN's packets are 0, IPV4's packets are 234489, ICMP are 1063, UDP are 1318, TCP are 232108,ARP packets are 118, Others are 1532. Snort produces 43265 alerts; 41.77% of the alerts (15968) are false positives. This percentage infect the security administrators to extract information for occurring attacks. Our method produce 31000 alerts, only 20% of alerts (6200) are false positives.
